














Publicly Listed Parent/Subsidiary Pairs: 







Faculty of Economics 
University of Tokyo 
7-3-1 Hongo 








Faculty of Economics 
University of Tokyo 
7-3-1 Hongo 





This paper explores the impact of publicly listed parent/subsidiary pairs on the pricing 
and volatility of companies’ shares.   
We construct a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model in which a parent and 
its subsidiary company are both publicly listed.    Two classes of traders participate in 
the market: institutional investors who have private information on the fundamentals of 
listed companies, and individual investors who have no private information.    A key 
feature of the model is that institutional investors attempt to optimize the risk-return 
tradeoff  relative to TOPIX, the  capitalization-weighted  index of the stock market. 
Individual investors are  assumed to  act without  reference to any performance 
benchmark. 
Within this framework we first establish the rather obvious result that the market 
portfolio of all outstanding shares is not an efficient portfolio. This result implies that 
benchmarking to TOPIX, which  is the surrogate of the  market portfolio without any 
adjustment for double-counting of parent/subsidiary pairs, generates excessive demand 
for shares of the subsidiary company.    We analyze the equilibrium of our market model 
and show that (1)the price of the subsidiary company’s share is pushed up to a level 
higher than that implied by its fundamentals, (2) the share price of other companies who 
are  highly correlated with  the subsidiary company  receive  similar effect, (3)the 
subsidiary company’s shares become more volatile and (4)tend to respond more to good 
news than to bad news.   
The results of this paper suggest that using TOPIX as the performance benchmark, 
which is the  prevailing  practice  in evaluating  pension  fund managers and other 
institutional investors,  may be causing distortion  in  share  prices and volatilities of 
subsidiary companies.    A new index which corrects for the double counting is worth a 
serious consideration.           Publicly Listed Parent/Subsidiary Pairs:
Benchmarking to TOPIX and Market Distortion
Takao Kobayashi∗ and Hiroyuki Yamada†
May 9, 2000
In the Japanese stock market, most institutional investors are evaluated
by how they overperform the market index, TOPIX. This is justiﬁed by the
famous result of the capital asset pricing model, ”Market portfolio is eﬃ-
cient.” Without any private information, investing in the market portfolio
makes the best result. Thus, we expect that investors with additional infor-
mation will overperform the market portfolio. From this aspect, we can use
the performance relative to the market portfolio as the evaluating criterion.
On the other hand, there are several subsidiary companies which have
their stocks listed on the Japanese stock market, such as NTT Docomo,
NTT Data and seven eleven. Some of these companies have quite large
market values.
Majority of these subsidiary companies’ outstanding stocks are owned
by their parent companies. Moreover, the parent companies do not liquidate
their stock holdings of the subsidiary company regardless of price. Thus the
real supply of the subsidiary stocks is much less than the total number of
outstanding shares. In other words, majority of the subsidiary company’s
shares are owned by nonspeculative shareholders.
The market portfolio is determined, in principle, by the total number of
outstanding shares. With these parent-subsidiary relations, however, it is
argued that the market portfolio should be modiﬁed. In fact, the market
portfolio of other countries are somewhat modiﬁed to settle this problem.
However, in the Japanese stock market, TOPIX, the most major market
portfolio is not modiﬁed. Thus it is no longer clear if the claim of the
capital asset pricing model holds.
In this paper, we will analyze how the stock market is aﬀected by this
parent-subsidiary relation and by the use of the market portfolio as a per-
formance benchmark. We have two questions:
(1) Is the market portfolio eﬃcient?
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1(2) How are the stock prices aﬀected by the stock-sharing relation and
using the market portfolio as a performance benchmark?
For analyzing these questions, we will use a noisy rational expectations
model. In this model, investors have their own information. Their private
information is aggregated through the market price. Thus the market price
plays the role of information aggregator. With noisy supply, however, the
information is not fully revealed in the price.
We will introduce two types of investors into this model: the institu-
tional investors who have private information and use the market portfolio
as a performance benchmark, and private investors who have no private in-
formation and do not use the market portfolio. We will solve the rational
expectations equilibrium under these assumptions, and analyze the eﬀect of
these assumptions.
We showed that the market portfolio is not the eﬃcient portfolio. More-
over, we analyzed what the eﬃcient portfolio should be in this situation.
We also ﬁnd that using such ineﬃcient benchmark makes the excess de-
mand for the subsidiary stock and the excess demand aﬀects the price of
the subsidiary stock. The price is pushed up, its volatility increase, and its
dynamics has some interesting characteristics. Other stocks’ prices are also
changed.
Our model is similar to the Gennote and Leland(1990)’s model. They
also analyzed the eﬀect of non-investment-purposed supply on the stock
price. We use their results and extend their model. We show that the price
function may become nonlinear with constant excess demand.
This paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we will
construct the model. In the section 2, we will answer the ﬁrst question,
and in the section 3 and 4 we will answer the second question. In the
section 3, we will analyze the question without considering the eﬀect of
short selling constraint and in the section 4 we analyzed the eﬀect of short
selling constraint.
1 model
We use a two period noisy rational expectations model. Each asset is traded
at date 0 and pays its liquidation value at date 1. Investors have their own
information about the liquidation values and trade the stocks using both
the private information and the market price.
1.1 Market
There are N companies having their stocks listed on the stock market. Com-
pany 1 is the subsidiary company of company 2. Company 2 has θ of the
2company 1’s outstanding shares. No other two companies have such stock-
sharing relation. The number of company i’s outstanding stocks per capita
is ω 
i. The equilibrium price of the stock i is pi. The ”pure” liquidation value,
the liquidation value with no stock-sharing relation, of company i per stock
at date 1 is δ 
i. Let ω  =( ω 
1,...,ω 
N),δ  =( δ 
1,...,δ 
N) and p =( p1,...,p N).
δ  is normally distributed with mean vector ¯ δ  and covariance matrix Σ 
We assume that the parent company does not buy the holding shares of
its subsidiary company regardless of price. Thus the supply of company 1’s
stock is equal to the number of its outstanding shares minus the number of
its shares owned by company 2. Let the supply of company i’s stock per




Similarly, the liquidation value of parent company equals to its ”pure”
liquidation value plus the liquidation value of the holding shares of subsidiary








The liquidation values of the companies per stock, denoted δ, are given by









3,...,δ N). Since the transformation is linear,
resulting δ is also normally distributed. We deﬁne the mean vector and the
covariance matrix of δ as ¯ δ and Σ, respectively.
There is also a riskless bond in the market. For simplicity we assume
that the bond is of perfectly elastic supply and the interest rate is zero.
1.2 Investors
We introduce two types of investors, the institutional investors (denoted
I) and the private investors (denoted U). The institutional investors are
diﬀerent from the private investors in two aspects. First, they have personal
information about the liquidation value of the stock. Second, they do not
maximize the normal utility function. They are the agent of other investors
and their revenues at date 1 is consumed by the principal investors. The
institutional investors themselves are evaluated and rewarded on the basis
of their relative performance to the market portfolio. Thus they maximize
the ”utility” for the excess return over the market portfolio. On the other
hand, the private investors have no personal information and maximize their
utility function. The mathematical setting is provided as follows.
Institutional investors Institutional investor j observes private informa-
tion sj = δ + εj and the market prices of stocks p. We assume that εj is
normaly distributed with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σε. It is identically
and independently distributed across investors, and independent of other
random variables.




I − dM)}| sj,p], (1)
3where dM is the payoﬀ of the market portfolio and d
j
I is the payoﬀ of investor
j’s portfolio. The price of investor j’s portfolio should be equal to that of
the market portfolio.




















I · p + b
j
I = ω  · p.
(2)
Private investors The private investors have no private information.
They only observe the market prices of the stocks. Their expected util-
ity function is privided as
E[−exp{−dU}| p], (3)




E[−exp(−wU · δ − bU)| p]
s.t. wU · p + bU = MU
(4)
where MU is the private investors’ initial endowment.
The wait of the institutional investors, the number of the institutional
investors divided by the total number of investors, is α. The wait of the
private investors is 1 − α.
1.3 Demand and supply
Demand The demand of stock per capita is given by
αWI +( 1− α)WU, (5)















Supply The supply of stocks ,ω , is modiﬁed by the noisy supply x.T h u s
the net supply of the stocks is given by
ω + x (7)
The noisy supply x is normally distributed with mean 0 and covariance ma-
trix Σx and independent of other random variables. Neither the institutional
investors nor the private investors can observe x.
42 The eﬃcient portfolio
In this section we will answer the ﬁrst question: Is the market portfolio
eﬃcient? To address this question, we assume that there are no institutional




There is no private information in the market and the net supply of the
stocks is observable. All the investors in the market maximize their expo-
nential utility. Under these assumptions, we have the same model as the
original capital asset pricing model, except that there is the stock-sharing
relation. Using the famous result of the capital asset pricing model, we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The eﬃcient stock portfolio is not the market portfolio ω  but
the supply of the stocks ω. The equilibrium price function can be written as
p = ¯ δ − σM (9)
where
σM =( Cov[δ1,δ M],...,Cov[δN,δ M])
δM = δ · ω
Proof The proof of the capital asset pricing model is given in many liter-
atures. We simply have to add the assumption that the supply of the stocks
is not equal to the market portfolio.
q.e.d.
σM is the vector of the covariance between the payoﬀ of the eﬃcient
portfolio and that of each stock. The price function takes the familiar form
in the capital asset pricing model. The only diﬀerence between this model
and the original capital asset pricing model is that the market portfolio is
not the eﬃcient portfolio.
The institutional investors use the ineﬃcient portfolio as the performance
benchmark. This implies that their behavior is also irrational in certain
aspects. In the subsequent section, we will analyze in what aspects their
behavior is irrational and how the irrationality aﬀects the stock prices.
53 The market equilibrium allowingshort selling
In the following analysis, we assume
α ∈ (0,1)
Σx  = O,
(10)
that is, the institutional investors and the noisy supply exists. There is
private information in the market and the net supply of the stocks is not
observable. There are also two classes of investors.
Additionally, in this section we assume that investors can short their po-
sition arbitrarily. This assumption is not considered explicitly in most asset
pricing models. However, as discussed in the next section, this assumption
plays important roles in our model
3.1 The optimal behavior of investors
We will assume that investors believe the equilibrium prices of the stocks p
is expressed as a function of state variable π, such as
p = f(π), (11)
and the inverse function f−1 is well-deﬁned. The state variable π is a linear
combination of the payoﬀ of the stocks δ and the noisy supply x, such as
π = δ + Ax, where A is a constant N × N matrix. This belief is conﬁrmed
in equilibrium.
The private investors The private investors observe the state variable
π through the market price p and form their conditional expectations of the
payoﬀ of the stocks at date 1. The conditional distribution is the normal
distribution with mean ˆ δU and covariance matrix ΣU, where
ˆ δU = ¯ δ +Σ UΣ−1









The detail of the derivation of the conditional distribution is summarized in
the Appendix.
Using this conditional expectation we can write the optimal portfolio of
the private investors wU as
wU =Σ −1
U (ˆ δU − p)
=Σ −1(¯ δ − p)+Σ −1
p (π − p)
(13)
63.2 The institutional investors
The institutional investor j uses the signal from the market price π and the
private information sj to form his or her conditional expectation. The con-
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Using this conditional expectation, we can write the optimal portfolio of






I − p)+ω  (15)
The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of above equation is the optimal
portfolio of institutional investor j without using the market portfolio as
the benchmark. The second term is the market portfolio. Thus the optimal
behavior of the institutional investors is, ”to buy the market portfolio and
add on the unconditional optimal portfolio”.
The portfolio w
j
I can be written as
w
j
I =Σ −1(¯ δ − p)+Σ −1
p (π − p)+Σ −1
ε (sj − p)+ω 
= wU +Σ −1
ε (sj − p)+ω .
(16)
The optimal portfolio of the institutional investor j is equal to the optimal
portfolio of the private investors plus the modiﬁcation based on his or her
private information plus the market portfolio.
As the number of the institutional investors increases, the average of
their optimal portfolios WI converges to
WI = wU +Σ −1
ε (δ − p)+ω . (17)
3.3 The market equilibrium
Using above result, we have the following theorem. The proof is provided
in the Appendix.




I +( 1− α)Σ−1
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I +( 1− α)Σ−1
U
 −1
(ω − αω )
(18)
where π = δ + 1
αΣεx, Σp = Var [ 1
αΣεx]
7The equilibrium price function is a linear combination of the state vari-
able π, the unconditional expectation of payoﬀ ¯ δ, the eﬃcient portfolio ω and
the market portfolio ω . The nature of this function is not clear, however.
To make the result simple and clear, we assume that that all the signals











where hp and hε are constant.
Under these assumptions, the covariance structures of the conditional










where hI =1+hp + hε,h U =1+hp.
hI and hU can be thought as the precision of the conditional expecta-
tions relative to the unconditional one. The new information only alters the
precision of their expectation.
In this case, we have the following proposition.



















hA = αhI +( 1− α)hU
σ1 =( Var [δ1],Cov[δ2,δ 1],...,Cov[δN,δ 1])
σ1 is the vector of the covariance between the payoﬀ of the subsidiary
company’s stock and that of each stock. The price function is written as a
linear conbination of the state variable π, the unconditional expectation ¯ δ,
σM and σ1.
The former three terms of the price function can be thought as an ex-
tensive form of the price function of the capital asset pricing model. They
resemble to the price function in equation (9). The appearance of the ﬁrst
term and the changes in coeﬃcients of these terms merely reﬂect the ef-
fects of introducing the private information and the noisy signal. Moreover,
the three terms are not aﬀected by the change of the parameter θ, which
represents the degree of stock-sharing relation.
It is the last term that reﬂects the eﬀect of introducing the stock-sharing
relation. We can now characterize the eﬀect. Company i’s stock price is
8modiﬁed in proportion to the covariance between the company’s stock’s
payoﬀ and the subsidiary company’s. The subsidiary company’s stock price
always rises and the other stock’s price changes according to its similarity
to the subsidiary stock.
As showed in equation (16), the institutional investors tend to have the
similar portfolio to the market portfolio. When the market portfolio equals
to the supply of stocks, this yields no problem. If the stock-sharing relation
exists, however, there arises an excess demand on the subsidiary stock, since
the market portfolio contains excessive amounts of the subsidiary stock.
This excess demand pushes up the subsidiary stock’s price. When the price
rises, investors reduce their position of the subsidiary stock and buy substi-
tutive stocks. Thus the rise in the subsidiary stock’s price in turn generates
secondary demands in the subsidiary-stock-like stocks and pushes up these
stocks’ prices. The σ1 term expresses these eﬀects.
On the other hand, the parent-subsidiary relation does not aﬀect the
dynamics of stock prices. As shown in equation (15), the excess demand for
the subsidiary stock is constant. Thus, however the state variable changes,
the excess demand does not change and its eﬀect on the prices does not
change, either. This result is consistent with the result of Gennote and
Leland(1990).
Gennote and Leland(1990) analyzed the eﬀect of the hedging supply on
the stock price dynamics. The hedging supply in their model is determined
only by the stock price and not aﬀected by the state variable directly. They
showed that the hedging supply may make the equilibrium price function
nonlinear and discontinuous. However, they also showed that, if the hedging
supply is constant or linear function of the stock price, the price function
remains linear. Our model is similar to their model. The excess demand
in our model is not aﬀected by the state variable, either. Moreover, it is
constant and not aﬀected by the prices. Thus using their result, we expect
that the price function be linear and the slope of the function unchanged.
However, there is one critical diﬀerence between their model and ours.
The hedging supply in their model is not so large in amount, while the excess
demand in our model is quite large. We will analyze this eﬀect in the next
section.
4 The market equilibrium without short selling
Above discussion is based on that investors can short their position arbi-
trarily. In usual model, investors rarely short their position in equilibrium.
Thus the assumption about short selling is not explicitly argued in most
case.
However, the excess demand in our model is so large that not a few
investors short their position of the subsidiary stock. Substituting equation
9(17) in the market-clear-condition equation, we have











 − αΣε(π − p) (22)
Since θ>0.5 and the α is suﬃciently large in the actual market, the demand
for the subsidiary stock may become negative. The assumption about short
selling is, thus, critical in our model. In this section, we will assume that
the private investors can not short their position of the subsidiary stock.
We additionally assume that institutional investors can short every stock
arbitrarily and the private investors can short other stocks arbitrarily. This
assumption serves only for simplicity. When the state variable π takes an ex-
treme value, other stocks may be shorted. Moreover, institutional investors
with highly noisy private information may short other stocks. Amounts of
these short selling are, however, quite small as compared with the amount
of the private investors’ short selling of the subsidiary stock.
4.1 The optimal behavior of investors
Like the preceding section, we will assume that all the investors believe
that the inverse function of the price function π = f−1(p) is well-deﬁned.
The optimal portfolios of the institutional investors remain the same as




E[−exp(−wU · δ − bU)| p]
s.t. wU · p + bU = MU ,w U1 > 0
(23)











(ˆ δU − p) if wU1 =0
(24)














and o is the n − 1 dimensional zero vector.
With short selling constraint, if the private investors’ optimal position of
the subsidiary stock is positive, the optimal portfolio is the same portfolio as
derived in the preceding section. If it goes nonpositive, their optimal port-
folio becomes the optimal portfolio with N-1 stocks, the optimal portfolio in
the situation that the subsidiary stock does not exist in the market.
104.2 The market equilibrium
Again, we will assume (19) for simplicity. Additionally, we will assume that
the (1,1) element of Σ−1 is positive. 1 Then we have following theorem.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 4 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium. The price
function can be written as the piece wise linear function of the form
p =

   
   









αhε(π − ¯ δ)+hU {(1 − α)σM − αθω 
1σ1}
 






















































φ is a constant N dimensional vector and k is a constant scalar.
g(π) is the equilibrium price function without short selling constraint.
With short selling constraint, the price function changes. However the
change occurs only in the subsidiary stock’s part, and all the other stocks’
part remains unchanged.
The price function for the subsidiary stock is written as a piecewise linear
function of N variables: π1,···,π N. Let all the state variables except the
subsidiary stock’s be given and ﬁxed. Then the price function p1 = f1(π1)
is of following shape
1Introducing this assumption is equivalent to assuming that, when the state variable
of the subsidiary stock π1 rises, the wait of the subsidiary stock in the optimal portfolio
should rise, under the condition that all the other parameters remain unchanged. Thus,





The kinked bold line is the price function f1(π1). The below broken line is
the price function without subsidiary company’s listing. The middle broken
line is the price function without short selling constraint. listing subsidiary
stock shifts the price curve upwards and short selling constraint kinks the
price function, also, upwards.
The upward bending of the price function brings forth two characteristics
in the dynamics of the subsidiary stock. First, the volatility of the subsidiary
stock increases, and, second, the subsidiary stock’s price becomes more sen-
sitive to good news. Since the sensitivity to bad news does not change, the
subsidiary stock’s price comes to have a tendency to respond to good news
more severely than to bad news.
Now we can answer the second question: How are the stock prices af-
fected by the parent-subsidiary relation? There are three eﬀects.
(1) The subsidiary stock’s price increase and other stock’s price changes
according to its similarity to the subsidiary stock.
(2) The volatility of the subsidiary stock increases.
(3) The subsidiary stock’s price becomes likely to be aﬀected more sensi-
tively by good news than by bad news.
Why the price function kinks upward? We will give an intuitive explana-
tion for this question in the remaining part of this section. The characteristic
of the private investors is critical for the answer.
When δ takes higher value, the institutional investors partially observes
it through the private information and increase their position. This pushes
up p. When p takes higher value, the private investors know that δ may
be high. However, since the net supply is ﬁxed, the equilibrium price is
12determined at too high level for the private investors to increase their posi-
tion. In fact, the price is so high that the private investors rather decrease
their position. The private investors decrease the position when δ increases,
and increase the position when δ decreases. Similarly, the private investors
increase their position if x increases, and decrease the position if x decreases.
Thus the the private investors decrease their position when π increase,
or when the price increase, and decrease the position when π decrease. This
means that the private investor’s deal pushes the price to the opposite di-
rection. In other words, the private investors have the role of reducing the
volatility of stock prices.
This is the source of the upward bending. When π1 increases, the private
investors decrease their position of the subsidiary stock. When π1 takes
suﬃciently high value, the private investors’ position becomes zero and they
can no longer decrease their position. In this situation, the private investors’
volatility reducing function no longer works and the price of the subsidiary
stock p1 becomes more sensitive.
In the Gennote and Leland(1990)’s model, the hedging supply should
be the decreasing function of the price so that the price function may be
nonlinear and discontinuous. However, we showed that even constant sup-
ply, or demand, can make the price function nonlinear, provided that the
supply is suﬃciently large. This diﬀerence is caused by the diﬀerence in the
logic used in each model. In their model, the non investment-purposed and
price-related supply produces additional demand of investors since their ad-
ditional demand produces additional supply. This makes the price function
nonlinear. In our model the excess demand itself does not aﬀect investors’
demand. It simply decrease net supply. However, since this decrease is quite
large in amount, this can make the price function nonlinear.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed how the stock market is aﬀected by listing a subsidiary com-
pany’s stock and using the market portfolio as a performance benchmark.
We showed that in such a situation, (i)the market portfolio is not the ef-
ﬁcient portfolio, (ii)the subsidiary stock’s price takes the higher value and
other stock’ price is modiﬁed according to its similarity to the subsidiary
stock, and (iii)the volatility of the subsidiary stock’ price increases and the
subsidiary stock’s price has a tendency to respond to good news more sen-
sitively than to bad news.
We introduced several assumptions for this analysis. Among them, fol-
lowing four assumptions are critical to the result. (a)There is a subsidiary
company, (b)there are two types of investors, (c)there is private information,
and (d)investors can not short their position. The result (i) depends only
on the assumption (a), the result (ii) depends on the assumption (a) and (c)
13and the result (iii) depends on all the assumptions.
We used a similar model to the Gennotte and Lealand(1990)’s model.
However, we developed a thoroughly diﬀerent logic from their model. We
showed that even a constant demand can make the price function nonlinear.
The logic developed in our model may be used in analyzing other prob-
lems. For example, the price dynamics of low-liquidity stocks may be an-
alyzed using similar logic. Moreover, in the Japanese stock market, stock
sharing is broadly practiced and not a monopoly of parent and subsidiary
companies. Our model can be applied to analyze the eﬀect of such general
stock-sharing relations.
Appendix
A Conditional distribution of investors



















where IN is N dimensional identity matrix. In this situation, the conditional
distribution on these signals is given as 2






I = δ +Σ ( IN IN)F−1
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sj − ¯ δ
 






















After lengthy but straightforward manipulation of these equations, we
have the equation (14). The private investors’ conditional distribution can
be derived in a similar way.
2See, for example, Harvey(1985) Chapter 4.
14B Proof of Theorem (2)
Using the equation (5) and (7), we hae the market clear condition
αWI +( 1− α)WU = ω + x (28)
Substituting the equation (13) and (17) in above equation, we have
Σ−1(¯ δ − p)+Σ −1
p (π − p)+αΣ−1
ε (δ − p)+αω  = w + x (29)
Assuming that π = δ − 1
αΣεx, we have
Σ−1(¯ δ − p)+Σ −1
p (π − p)+αΣ−1
ε (π − p)+αω  = w (30)
This equation is equivalent to the equation (18). Since the equation (18) is
the linear function of π, the inverse function is well-deﬁned.
C Proof of Theorem (4)
The equation (25) can be derived in a similar way used in the above proof.

























provided that wU1 ≥ 0. Using this equation, we can show that, when wU1 =
0, following equation holds.
1
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−αhε(π − ¯ δ)+hU
 




This equation is equivalent to the equation (32). Thus the price function is
continuous.
Moreover, transforming the equation (32) we can write φ as
φ = l × (1,−` σt
1` Σ−1)t (34)
where l is a positive constant.
Finally, using the equation (25) and (34), we can show that any p1(π)
which satisﬁes φ·π ≥ k is larger than any p1(π) which satisﬁes φ·π<k . Since
the other part of the price function is linear, this means that for arbitrary
p, there exists unique π. Thus the inverse function is well-deﬁned.
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